Duty of “Sameness”?: \u3cem\u3eBartlett\u3c/em\u3e Preserves Generic Drug Consumers’ Design Defect Claims by Sawyer, Caitlin
Boston College Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 2
1-31-2013
Duty of “Sameness”?: Bartlett Preserves Generic
Drug Consumers’ Design Defect Claims
Caitlin Sawyer
Boston College Law School, caitlin.sawyer.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Food and Drug
Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caitlin Sawyer, Duty of “Sameness”?: Bartlett Preserves Generic Drug Consumers’ Design Defect Claims, 54 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 1 (2013),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/2
1 
DUTY OF “SAMENESS”?: BARTLETT 
PRESERVES GENERIC DRUG CONSUMERS’ 
DESIGN DEFECT CLAIMS 
Abstract: On May 2, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held in Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. that the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not preempt design defect claims against 
generic manufacturers. The court reasoned that, by not manufacturing 
the drug, a generic manufacturer could avoid state design defect liability 
without violating the federal requirement that a generic drug remain “the 
same” as a listed brand-name drug. This Comment argues that, in so 
holding, the First Circuit misconstrued Supreme Court precedent and 
contravened the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. It further 
argues that, on review, the Supreme Court should hold that the FDCA 
preempts design defect claims against generic manufacturers. Finally this 
Comment proposes that Congress enact a federal damages remedy to give 
injured consumers some relief. 
Introduction 
 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires that 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) deem all drugs “safe” 
and “effective” before they are marketed for sale.1 Whereas the FDA 
drug approval process is lengthy and rigorous, the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments established an abbreviated process for generic versions of 
FDA-approved drugs.2 The abbreviated process aims to ensure that pre-
scription drugs remain accessible to consumers without compromising 
drug safety and effectiveness.3 Congress struck a balance between these 
competing goals by implementing a “sameness” requirement.4 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2010). 
2 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-
Waxman Amendments), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–92 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 355( j) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 355( j)(2)(C)(i). 
4 See id. § 355( j)(2)(A). Under the abbreviated approval process, a generic manufac-
turer must show that the new drug is the same as a listed drug in terms of its active ingre-
dients, dosage, strength, route of administration, and label to satisfy the “sameness” re-
quirement. See id. 
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 It is an open question whether the Hatch-Waxman Amendments’ 
“sameness” requirement preempts state law design defect claims assert-
ed against generic manufacturers.5 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that this “duty of sameness” preempts state law failure-to-warn 
claims against generic manufacturers.6 The Court, however, did not ad-
dress whether the FDCA would also preempt other state law tort claims.7 
 In 2012, in Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit became the first federal appeals court to 
address whether the FDCA preempts design defect claims asserted 
against generic manufacturers.8 The court held that, despite the federal 
requirement that generic drugs remain the same as their FDA-
approved brand-name counterparts, design defect claims against gener-
ic manufacturers are not preempted.9 According to the court, a generic 
manufacturer could comply with both state and federal law regarding 
drug design if it refrains from making the drug.10 
 The First Circuit’s reasoning, however, sharply diverged from the 
rationale of many district courts that have addressed this issue.11 These 
district courts have concluded that design defect claims are preempted 
by the FDCA because compliance with both state and federal law is im-
possible.12 The desire to preserve an injured consumer’s only means of 
                                                                                                                      
5 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). A design defect claim is a state tort cause of action asserted against a manufac-
turer when a drug is allegedly sold in a defective condition (i.e., its foreseeable risks out-
weigh its benefits). See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 6(c) (1998). 
6 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575, 2581. A failure-to-warn claim is a state tort cause of action 
asserted against a manufacturer that allegedly failed to provide a warning label that “ren-
ders [a drug] reasonably safe.” See id. at 2572–73; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. 
Liab. § 6(d) (1998). 
7 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581. 
8 See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-142). 
9 See id. at 37–38. 
10 See id. at 37. 
11 See, e.g., Aucoin v. Amneal Pharm., L.L.C., No. 11-1275, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9 
(E.D. La. July 20, 2012); In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
2:11-md-2226-DCR, 2012 WL 718618, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2012); In re Pamidronate 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 479, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also infra notes 61–70 and 
accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of these cases). 
12 See Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL 718618, at *3; In re 
Pamidronate, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 484. Rejecting the argument that withdrawing a product 
from the market is a sufficiently meaningful choice to avoid impossibility, these courts 
reasoned that a generic manufacturer cannot alter a drug’s design without violating the 
federal requirement that its design remain the same as that of its brand-name counterpart. 
See Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL 718618, at *3; In re Pamidronate, 
842 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
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redress motivated the First Circuit’s conclusion in Bartlett.13 Indeed, 
preemption would leave many injured consumers unable to obtain 
compensation.14 But preempting these claims ensures that generic 
drugs remain inexpensive for all consumers.15 Thus, preempting these 
claims is preferable.16 
 Part I of this Comment discusses the FDCA’s preemptive scope and 
the Bartlett court’s holding that preemption does not extend to design 
defect claims against generic drug manufacturers.17 Part II addresses 
alternative interpretations of the federal requirement of “sameness” in 
the context of design defect claims against generic manufacturers.18 
Finally, Part III argues that the First Circuit’s decision misconstrues Su-
preme Court precedent and contravenes the objectives of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments.19 Thus, Part III urges the Supreme Court to 
hold that the FDCA preempts design defect claims against generic drug 
manufacturers and proposes that Congress enact a federal compensa-
tion scheme to provide limited compensatory relief for injured con-
sumers.20 
I. The Preemptive Scope of the FDCA 
 The preemptive scope of the FDCA turns on the interplay between 
state and federal duties imposed on prescription drug manufacturers.21 
By introducing an abbreviated approval procedure for generic drugs 
and requiring that a generic drug remain the same as its brand-name 
counterpart, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments created the potential for 
conflict between state and federal law.22 Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the extent to which the FDCA preempts state law tort claims 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38 (“[H]aving lost her warning claim by the mere chance of 
her drug store’s selection of a generic, the Supreme Court might be less ready to deprive 
Bartlett of her remaining avenue of relief.”). 
14 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38. 
15 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574, 2582. 
16 See id.; infra notes 71–92 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 21–60 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 71–92 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 86–92 and accompanying text. 
21 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577. For example, in 2011, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the FDCA preempted failure-to-warn claims against generic 
drug manufacturers because state tort law required a generic manufacturer to strengthen 
its warning label to sufficiently warn consumers of the risks, but federal law prohibited 
these manufacturers from making unilateral changes. See id. 
22 See id. at 2582. 
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against drug manufacturers.23 The Court, however, has not yet articulat-
ed the FDCA’s precise preemptive scope.24 Section A discusses the “duty 
of sameness” imposed on generic manufacturers and how this duty may 
interact with state law duties to alter a drug.25 Section B explores the 
First Circuit’s Bartlett decision in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
preemption jurisprudence.26 
A. Duty of “Sameness”: The Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA 
 In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments introduced an abbrevi-
ated new drug application (“ANDA”) procedure for FDA approval of 
generic drugs shown to be “safe” and “effective.”27 Generic manufactur-
ers that utilize this process have an “ongoing federal duty of sameness” 
that requires that a generic drug remain the same as its brand-name 
counterpart.28 To submit a valid ANDA, a manufacturer must show that 
the generic drug is the same as its brand-name counterpart in terms of 
its active ingredients, dosage, strength, route of administration, and la-
bel.29 This abbreviated procedure enables generic manufacturers to de-
velop new “copycat drugs” inexpensively.30 The ANDA process, there-
fore, is intended to reduce medical costs by increasing the production 
and consumption of generic drugs.31 As a result, the consumption of 
generic drugs has become much more widespread.32 
 The ANDA procedure, and its corresponding federal “sameness” 
requirement, may conflict with duties imposed by state tort law.33 A fed-
                                                                                                                      
23 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). 
24 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; Levine, 555 U.S. at 581; Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37. 
25 See infra notes 27–37 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 38–60 and accompanying text. 
27 See 21 U.S.C. § 355( j)(2)(A), ( j)(2)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). The process for 
approving new brand-name drugs is much more extensive. See id. § 355(b)(1). 
28 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 21 U.S.C. § 355( j)(2)(A). These requirements ensure that the ANDA procedure 
does not compromise the FDA’s requirement that any marketed drug be “safe” and “effec-
tive.” See id. § 355(b)(1)(A), ( j)(2)(C)(i). 
30 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37. The sale of generic drugs is permitted only after the pa-
tent on the brand-name drug has expired. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 n.9. 
31 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37; see also Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the ANDA procedure eliminates “the need for generic manufactur-
ers to prove . . . safety and efficacy independently”); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 14–15 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647 (“The purpose . . . is to make available more low 
cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure . . . .”). 
32 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the consump-
tion of generic drugs has grown from approximately 19% of the drugs sold in 1984 to 75% 
in 2009). 
33 See id. at 2582 (majority opinion). 
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eral preemption analysis traditionally begins with a presumption against 
preemption and assesses whether Congress manifested its intent to 
preempt state law.34 If this intention is not expressly indicated in the text 
of a statute, intent can be implied when a federal statute directly con-
flicts with state law, rendering compliance with both requirements im-
possible.35 Given that a generic drug must remain the same as its brand-
name counterpart, it would be impossible (without choosing to not 
make a drug) for a generic manufacturer to comply with both this ongo-
ing federal “sameness” requirement and the state law duty to alter a 
drug to avoid strict liability to injured consumers.36 Although this con-
flict of duties for generic manufacturers suggests that federal preemp-
tion may be implied, courts have disagreed on the extent to which the 
FDCA preempts state law tort claims.37 
B. The First Circuit Limits the FDCA’s Preemptive Scope in Bartlett 
 In Bartlett, the First Circuit considered whether the FDCA 
preempts design defect claims against generic manufacturers.38 Karen 
Bartlett asserted a design defect claim against the manufacturer, Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Company (“Mutual”), after she ingested generic 
sulindac for her shoulder pain, experienced severe skin deterioration, 
and spent seventy days in the hospital.39 Ms. Bartlett was diagnosed with 
Stevens-Johnson syndrome (“SJS”), a hypersensitivity reaction, which 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). These two components (i.e., presumption and intent) 
are the cornerstones of the preemption analysis. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 565 (citing Retail 
Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). This analysis is grounded in 
the notion of dual sovereignty embodied by the federal system. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. 
35 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577 & n.5. Intent to preempt can also be implied when a 
statute completely occupies the regulated field or when state law interferes with the pur-
poses and objectives embodied by the federal statute. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 507–08. 
36 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577; Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9. 
37 Compare Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (holding that the FDCA preempts failure-to-warn 
claims because it is impossible for a manufacturer to comply with both a state law duty to 
strengthen its warning label and a federal requirement that the label remain the same), 
and Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9 (finding that the FDCA preempts design defect claims 
against generic manufacturers), with Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38 (concluding that the FDCA 
does not preempt design defect claims because a manufacturer can comply with both state 
and federal requirements by not manufacturing the drug). 
38 Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 35–36. 
39 Id. at 34. Although her doctor prescribed brand-name Clinoril for her pain, a New 
Hampshire pharmacy filled her prescription with the generic version of sulindac pursuant 
to the state’s generic drug substitution law. See id.; see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318:47-d 
(2008). 
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progressed to potentially fatal toxic epidermal necrolysis (“TEN”).40 
These conditions were known risks of ingesting sulindac.41 Due to the 
drug’s propensity to cause these conditions, Ms. Bartlett sued Mutual in 
2008 for, among other things, defective design.42 After Ms. Bartlett pre-
vailed at trial, Mutual appealed to the First Circuit to determine wheth-
er Ms. Bartlett’s claim was preempted by federal law.43 
 Because the First Circuit is the only federal appeals court that has 
directly addressed whether the FDCA preempts design defect claims 
against generic manufacturers, and the Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on preemption of design defect claims, the Bartlett court looked to 
two Supreme Court cases in the failure-to-warn context for guidance.44 
In 2009, in Wyeth v. Levine, and in 2011, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the 
Court addressed federal preemption of failure-to-warn claims.45 Togeth-
er, these decisions establish that the FDCA preempts failure-to-warn 
claims against generic, but not brand-name, manufacturers.46 
 In Levine, the Supreme Court held that the FDCA does not 
preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against brand-name manufac-
turers.47 Beginning with the traditional presumption against preemp-
tion, the Court observed that a brand-name manufacturer is not bound 
by a federal “sameness” requirement.48 The Court thus concluded that 
a brand-name manufacturer can simultaneously comply with state and 
federal labeling duties by strengthening its label.49 Because the FDA 
had traditionally viewed state tort law as “a complementary form of 
drug regulation,” the Court reasoned that complying with the state du-
ty to include a stronger label to avoid tort liability would not obstruct 
the purpose of the FDCA.50 Finally, the Court reasoned that the lack of 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34. 
41 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co. (Bartlett I ), 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010). 
42 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co. (Bartlett II ), 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228–29, 246 (D.N.H. 
2011). Mutual removed all of Ms. Bartlett’s common law tort claims from a New Hamp-
shire trial court to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Bartlett I, 731 
F. Supp. 2d at 141. The district court found that the FDCA did not preempt Ms. Bartlett’s 
design defect claim and denied Mutual’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. 
43 Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 35. The First Circuit also considered the merits of Ms. Bartlett’s 
design defect claim, specifically whether a propensity to cause SJS/TEN is a sufficient de-
fect to assert a claim, even though sulindac is a one molecule drug that lacks an alternative 
design. Id. at 36. 
44 Id. at 37–38. 
45 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577; Levine, 555 U.S. at 565. 
46 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; Levine, 555 U.S. at 581. 
47 Levine, 555 U.S. at 581. 
48 See id. at 565, 568. 
49 See id. at 573. 
50 See id. at 575, 578. 
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an express preemption provision in the statute suggested that Congress 
did not intend to preempt state law tort claims against brand-name 
drug manufacturers.51 
 In Mensing, however, the Court did not extend its rationale in Lev-
ine to the generic drug context.52 Instead, it held that failure-to-warn 
claims against generic manufacturers are preempted.53 Justice Clarence 
Thomas, writing for the majority, reasoned that, unlike the duties of 
brand-name manufacturers, the distinct state and federal obligations 
imposed on generic manufacturers directly conflict.54 The Court ob-
served that generic manufacturers cannot independently strengthen a 
warning label as required to avoid tort liability without violating the 
“ongoing federal duty of sameness.”55 Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that the FDCA preempts failure-to-warn claims asserted against 
generic manufacturers.56 
 Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Levine and distin-
guishing Mensing, the First Circuit held in Bartlett that the FDCA does 
not preempt design defect claims against generic manufacturers on 
three grounds.57 First, the court concluded that Levine articulated a 
general rule that the FDCA does not preempt state law tort claims 
against drug manufacturers.58 Second, the court distinguished Mensing 
because it is possible for a generic manufacturer to avoid design defect 
liability if it refrains from manufacturing the drug.59 Third, preserving 
                                                                                                                      
51 See id.; cf. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 521, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006) 
(expressly preempting any state requirement “different from, or in addition to, any [FDCA] 
requirement” for medical devices). 
52 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577. 
53 See id. at 2581. 
54 See id. at 2574–75. 
55 See id. at 2575, 2581 (internal quotation marks omitted). Approval through the 
ANDA procedure requires that the generic manufacturer include a label that is “the same” 
as the brand-name drug’s label unless the manufacturer seeks the assistance of the FDA to 
change the label. See id. at 2575–76. 
56 See id. at 2579, 2581. 
57 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38. Recently, a few district courts have cited approvingly the 
First Circuit’s rationale in Bartlett. See Caouette v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. C-12-1814 
EMC, 2012 WL 3283858, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (“[I]t is not obvious that Mensing 
impossibility preemption would apply to a design defect claim.”); Halperin v. Merck, 
Sharpe & Dohme Corp., No. 11 C 9076, 2012 WL 1204728, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2012) 
(“Neither the Mensing opinion, nor the underlying proceedings in the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits, directly address strict liability design defect claims.”). 
58 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37–38. 
59 See id. at 38. According to the court, the availability of this choice distinguished de-
sign defect claims from failure-to-warn claims because once a drug is manufactured, “the 
generic maker has no choice as to label.” See id. Although a manufacturer could theoreti-
cally avoid a failure-to-warn claim by not manufacturing a drug, state law does not require 
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injured consumers’ ability to sue generic manufacturers drove the ul-
timate conclusion that the FDCA does not preempt design defect 
claims.60 
II. Duty of “Sameness” and Impossibility: Alternative 
Approaches to Design Defect Preemption 
 Although the First Circuit is the only federal appeals court to di-
rectly consider the issue, many federal district courts have found, con-
trary to Bartlett’s holding, that the FDCA does preempt design defect 
claims against generic manufacturers.61 In part, this disagreement arises 
from differing interpretations of “impossibility” when assessing a gener-
ic manufacturer’s ability to avoid state tort liability while complying with 
the federal “sameness” requirement.62 The fact that generic drug man-
ufacturers could comply with both state and federal requirements by 
not making a drug drove the First Circuit’s conclusion that design de-
fect claims are not preempted.63 
 In contrast, some district courts have rejected this option as a false 
choice and consequently have concluded that design defect claims 
                                                                                                                      
a manufacturer to do so. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 26, Mut. Pharm. Co. v. 
Bartlett, No. 12-142 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2012). Thus, as Ms. Bartlett contends, complying with 
both state and federal law is possible in the design defect context because state law does 
not obligate a manufacturer to refrain from making a drug. See id. 
60 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38. 
61 See, e.g., Aucoin v. Amneal Pharm., L.L.C., No. 11-1275, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9 
(E.D. La. July 20, 2012) (finding that the FDCA preempts design defect claims against 
generic manufacturers); In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
2:11-md-2226-DCR, 2012 WL 718618, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2012) (same); In re 
Pamidronate Prods. Liab. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 479, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (same). Alt-
hough other federal appeals courts have addressed federal preemption after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), the rulings are limited to 
the failure-to-warn context. See Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co., 469 F. App’x 556, 556 (9th Cir. 
2012) (concluding that the FDCA preempts failure-to-warn claims against generic manu-
facturers), vacating 630 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc. (Mensing Order), 
658 F.3d 867, 867 (8th Cir. 2011) (same), vacating in relevant part 588 F.3d 603, 611 (8th 
Cir. 2009); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); Demahy v. 
Actavis, Inc., 650 F.3d 1045, 1045 (5th Cir. 2011) (same), reversing 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
62 Compare Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-142) (holding no preemption because it was possi-
ble to comply with both state and federal law by choosing not to make the drug), with In re 
Darvocet, 2012 WL 718618, at *3 (finding preemption because “the idea that [the generic 
manufacturers] should have simply stopped selling [the drug] is an oversimplified solu-
tion”). 
63 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38. 
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against generic manufacturers are preempted.64 These district courts 
have held such claims are preempted because the Supreme Court in 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing impliedly rejected the “failure-to-withdraw” rea-
soning that the Bartlett court relied on to distinguish failure-to-warn 
claims.65 Although the Court in Mensing did not explicitly ground its 
decision in the “failure-to-withdraw” rationale,66 the Eighth Circuit, on 
remand, vacated the portion of its opinion that relied on this reason-
ing.67 Thus, many lower courts continue to hold that refraining from 
manufacturing a drug is not a sufficient ground to show that a generic 
manufacturer could independently comply with state law.68 Instead, the 
Mensing rationale supports preemption of design defect claims because 
it is otherwise impossible for a generic manufacturer to comply with a 
state law duty to alter a drug’s design without violating the FDCA.69 
Other district courts omit discussion about “failure-to-withdraw” and 
have simply found that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Mensing applies 
directly to the defective design context due to the federal “sameness” 
requirement.70 
III. The Better Approach: Preempting Design Defect Claims 
Against Generic Manufacturers 
 The First Circuit’s conclusion that the FDCA does not preempt 
design defect claims against generic manufacturers misconstrues U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent and contravenes the objectives of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments by failing to ensure that generic drugs remain 
accessible for consumers.71 The Supreme Court has granted review of 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL 718618, at *3; In re 
Pamidronate, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
65 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577–78; Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *8–9; In re Darvocet, 
2012 WL 718618, at *3. 
66 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577, 2581 n.8. 
67 See Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *8; see also Mensing Order, 658 F.3d at 867. 
68 See Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL 718618, at *3. 
69 See Aucoin, 2012 WL 2990697, at *9; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL 718618, at *3. But see su-
pra note 59 and accompanying text. 
70 See Lyman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-262, 2012 WL 368675, at *4 (D. Vt. Feb. 3, 2012); 
In re Pamidronate, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
71 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (implementing a require-
ment that an ANDA drug be “the same as” a listed drug to ensure that generic drugs remain 
affordable without compromising safety), and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574–
75 (2011) (referring to a generic drug manufacturer’s “ongoing federal duty of ‘sameness’”), 
with Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the importance 
of preserving a cause of action for generic consumers because it is possible for a manufactur-
er to comply with both state and federal requirements by choosing not to manufacture a 
drug), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-142). 
10 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:E. Supp. 
the First Circuit’s Bartlett decision.72 Although affirming Bartlett would 
preserve a cause of action for generic drug consumers, a conclusion 
that the FDCA does not preempt these claims would require manufac-
turers to absorb the costs of inevitable lawsuits, potentially forcing af-
fordable drugs off of the market.73 Instead, the Supreme Court should 
hold that the FDCA preempts design defect claims.74 Congress could 
then enact a limited compensatory damages remedy to protect con-
sumers injured by generic drugs.75 
 The First Circuit’s Bartlett decision misconstrues the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing and Wyeth v. Levine.76 The fact 
that generic drug manufacturers could not comply with both state and 
federal law by changing their warning labels was central to the Court’s 
holding in Mensing that failure-to-warn claims against generic manufac-
turers are preempted.77 In Levine, however, the Court held that failure-
to-warn claims against brand-name manufacturers are not preempted 
because a brand-name manufacturer can independently strengthen its 
label, and thereby comply with both state and federal law while continu-
ing to sell its drug.78 Given that a generic manufacturer is unable to 
comply with both state and federal requirements while continuing to 
sell its drug, it is inconsistent with Levine and Mensing to draw a distinc-
tion, as the Bartlett court did, between failure-to-warn and design defect 
claims on the basis of a “choice” to not manufacture a generic drug.79 
                                                                                                                      
72 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
73 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 626 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
cost-benefit analysis should consider “the interests of all potential users” rather than only 
those of injured consumers); cf. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592–93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(observing that preemption eliminates a cause of action for many injured consumers). 
74 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38 (“Given the widespread use of generic drugs . . . this issue 
needs a decisive answer from the only court that can supply it.”); infra notes 76–88 and 
accompanying text. 
75 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (“Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change 
the law and regulations if they so desire.”); infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
76 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38 (acknowledging that distinguishing design defect claims 
from failure-to-warn claims on the basis of a choice not to manufacture a drug is in tension 
with part of the rationale in Mensing); infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
77 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574–75, 2581. 
78 See Levine, 555 U.S. at 568, 578; cf. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 611 (8th Cir. 
2009) (reasoning that generic manufacturers “could have simply stopped selling the prod-
uct” to comply with both state and federal law), vacated in relevant part by 658 F.3d 867 (8th 
Cir. 2011). 
79 See In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:11-md-2226-
DCR, 2012 WL 718618, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2012) (explaining that a generic manufac-
turer’s ability to stop selling a drug is an insufficient choice to distinguish Mensing or to 
justify a finding that design defect claims are not preempted); cf. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38 
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 Moreover, allowing design defect claims against generic manufac-
turers, as the First Circuit did in Bartlett, contravenes the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments’ twin goals of providing inexpensive and accessible drugs 
for consumers without compromising drug safety and effectiveness.80 
That is, allowing injured consumers to assert design defect claims 
against manufacturers of a generic drug that the FDA deemed “safe” 
and “effective” undercuts these congressional goals.81 The risk of strict 
liability, and perhaps excessive compensatory damages, requires a gener-
ic manufacturer to decide whether to produce a drug and absorb the 
costs of inevitable tort liability or to remove its drug from the market 
altogether.82 
 Preempting these claims, on the other hand, leaves existing safety 
and effectiveness protections intact while furthering Congress’s goal of 
providing inexpensive drugs for consumers.83 First, because an ap-
proved generic drug must remain “the same” as a listed brand-name 
drug, consumers are protected by the extensive initial FDA approval 
process that requires documentation of the drug’s safety and effective-
ness.84 Second, eliminating excessive tort liability costs will ensure that 
                                                                                                                      
(noting that not making a drug would avoid design defect claims as well as failure-to-warn 
claims). 
80 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574, 2577 (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Amend-
ments enable inexpensive drug production); see also H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 14–15 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647 (“The purpose . . . is to make available 
more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure”); cf. Bart-
lett, 678 F.3d at 37 (“There is no doubt that Congress wanted to reduce medical costs by 
spurring generic copycat drugs . . . .”). 
81 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37–38. Allowing design defect claims undercuts these goals by 
empowering a jury to analyze the risks and benefits of a generic drug, and thereby to se-
cond-guess the FDA’s findings. See id. Moreover, the fact that a state jury can contravene a 
federal agency’s risk-benefit analysis likely violates the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. Const. 
art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land 
. . . .”); see also Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“Indeed, one would 
think that tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or strict-liability standard is less 
deserving of preservation. . . . A jury . . . sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, 
and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not rep-
resented in court.”). 
82 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38. 
83 See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (instructing new drug appli-
cants to submit investigation reports “to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and 
. . . effective in use”); id. § 355( j)(2)(A) (requiring a manufacturer to show that a generic 
drug is the same as an already approved listed drug); supra notes 27–29 and accompanying 
text. 
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the ANDA approval process remains inexpensive in practice, rather 
than only in theory.85 
 Therefore, upon review, the Supreme Court should hold that the 
FDCA preempts design defect claims.86 Doing so will ensure that gener-
ic drugs remain accessible to consumers.87 To address the First Circuit’s 
concern that this result fails adequately to protect the interests of con-
sumers injured by generic drugs, however, Congress must act.88 
 Congress should enact a limited compensatory damages remedy to 
provide injured generic drug consumers with a means to obtain com-
pensation.89 A federal statutory remedy that limits available compensa-
tory relief for injured consumers and excludes punitive damages will 
compensate consumers while increasing the availability of beneficial 
and inexpensive generic drugs.90 Given the market dominance of ge-
neric drugs, a federal remedy is necessary to protect the consumers 
                                                                                                                      
85 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355( j)(2)(A)) (explaining that the 
ANDA procedure does not require a manufacturer to conduct “the clinical trials already 
performed,” which enables inexpensive generic drug production); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 
at 14–15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. 
86 See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
87 See Levine, 555 U.S. at 626 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that, unlike juries, the 
FDA’s drug-approval determinations consider “the interests of all potential users”). 
Preemption is particularly important to protect consumers who benefit from generic drugs 
that lack an alternative design because the risk of design defect liability could result in the 
drug’s removal from the market. See id.; Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37 (observing that Mutual 
“cannot legally make sulindac in another composition”). 
88 See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 38 (“[H]aving lost her warning claim by the mere chance of 
her drug store’s selection of a generic, the Supreme Court might be less ready to deprive 
Bartlett of her remaining avenue of relief.”); cf. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (“Congress and 
the FDA retain the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.”). 
89 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582; see also Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort 
Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 73, 113–14 
(2008) (arguing that the FDA and Congress are better positioned to determine liability 
risks than “a multitude of lay state court juries [that] wield different and notoriously 
opaque standards”). Notably, the FDCA as originally introduced “would have provided a 
federal cause of action for damages for injured consumers.” See Levine, 555 U.S. at 574 n.7 
(citing H.R. 6110, 73d Cong. § 25 (1st Sess. 1933)). Moreover, the feasibility of a compen-
satory damages remedy is reinforced by the success of the federal no-fault compensation 
program for victims of vaccine injuries. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1099–1100 
(2011) (explaining that, by implementing this program, Congress intended to establish a 
scheme that would compensate victims while relieving the financial burden on vaccine 
manufacturers). 
90 See Levine, 555 U.S. at 626 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing “the interests of all po-
tential users” rather than only those of injured consumers); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857 (1984), 
at 14–15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. But see Allison Stoddart, Note, Missing 
After Mensing: A Remedy for Generic Drug Consumers, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1967, 1997–98, 2000 
(2012) (arguing that the FDA should amend its regulations to allow a generic manufactur-
er unilaterally to strengthen its label, even if doing so increases liability costs). 
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who will inevitably be injured by them.91 Unlike state tort liability, a 
federal statutory remedy that provides limited compensatory relief will 
adequately compensate consumers without forcing affordable, benefi-
cial drugs off of the market.92 
Conclusion 
 Generic drug manufacturers must be shielded from the risk of ex-
cessive state tort liability. In Bartlett, the First Circuit concluded that the 
FDCA does not preempt design defect claims against generic manufac-
turers, reasoning that it is possible to comply with both state and feder-
al requirements by choosing not to make a drug. Although this holding 
preserves a cause of action for injured consumers, it contravenes the 
goals of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments by increasing the costs of ge-
neric drug production to the detriment of consumers who benefit from 
the availability of inexpensive alternatives to brand-name drugs. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court, which has granted review of the First 
Circuit’s decision in Bartlett, should extend PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing to 
preempt design defect claims asserted against generic manufacturers. 
At the same time, to protect the interests of all generic drug consum-
ers, Congress should expressly displace state tort liability with a federal 
remedy enabling limited compensatory relief under the FDCA. A fed-
eral damages remedy will protect consumers who benefit from generic 
drugs while compensating the injured. 
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91 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (observing that “it is the special, and different, regula-
tion of generic drugs that . . . [brought more generic drugs] more quickly and cheaply to 
the market”); cf. id. at 2583, 2592–93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that, due to ge-
neric substitution laws, a consumer’s ability to sue now turns on the “happenstance of 
whether her pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or generic drug”). 
92 See Levine, 555 U.S. at 626 (Alito, J., dissenting); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 14–15, re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. 
